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Brinson: Fair Housing and Homeless Shelters

NOTE
JUSTIFYING DISCRIMINATION:
HOW THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CIRCUMVENTED THE INTENT OF THE
FAIR HOUSING ACT
INTRODUCTION

Imagine a facility that provides shelter and care for people who are
homeless, indigent or otherwise down on their luck. The owners and
staff of the organization that manages this facility want to ensure that
they are providing, as much as is possible, the necessary services for a
community's needy population, but doing so has become increasingly
difficult. Money is tight, the staff is short-handed, and the demand for
these services is ever-increasing. The owners and staff decide that a
change is needed because the facility will not survive operating in its
current fashion. Accordingly, the facility decides to save substantial
funds by closing its doors to men because feeding women and children is
less expensive. Or, alternatively, the owners decide to save money by
decreasing the number of beds available to disabled persons because
employing staff members who are qualified to care for them is doubly
expensive. Or, imagine that the facility, by not accepting women, was
able to limit its payroll expenses by employing fewer security guards
because fewer security guards are needed when the occupants are of a
single gender. Now imagine that all the money saved by these
adjustments is placed into a fund that will make possible another, betterprepared, and more economical facility to serve those persons who are
excluded by these decisions, greatly increasing the facilities available to
all persons in need.
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As it stands today, this cannot occur in the Ninth Circuit, the
judicial circuit covering the western United States. 1 The hypothetical
facility described above likely would not be able to save its money in the
manner described because its policies discriminate against protected
classes of persons. 2 If the facility's directors told the court that they were
changing their policies to save money for another, better facility, it
would likely not change the court's ruling. 3 Such a situation arose in
Boise, Idaho in 2005. In Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise
("Community House"), the plaintiffs, former residents of a homeless
shelter, sued the city of Boise, Idaho, claiming that when they were
forced to leave the shelter, the city violated the Fair Housing Act. 4 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that safety
concerns and actually beneficial discrimination are the only two
acceptable justifications for this type of discrimination, and neither of
them, when applied as the Ninth Circuit applies them, allows for the
long-term planning of the facility as described above. 5
This Note argues that the test applied by the Ninth Circuit in
Community House was unreasonably inflexible and inconsistent with the
goals of the Fair Housing Act, and that, by allowing for only limited,
inflexible exceptions, the court foreclosed an opportunity to expand free
or affordable housing for homeless women, men, and families. By
contrast, a more flexible approach that weighs the adverse impact on the
alleged victim against the benefits of the offered justifications, would
better serve the purposes of the Fair Housing Act by allowing each
community to maximize the housing opportunities it offers.
Part I of this Note discusses Congress's goals in passing the Fair
Housing Act and how the Act applies to homeless shelters. Part II of this
Note describes the tests used by the Eighth and Tenth Circuits and the
Supreme Court's approach in similar types of cases. Part III analyzes the
Ninth Circuit's majority opinion in Community House, Inc. v. City of
Boise. Part IV argues that the Ninth Circuit's rigid application of the test
in Community House is inconsistent with the Fair Housing Act. Finally,
Part V contends that a more flexible approach to Fair Housing Act claims

I See Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). The states and
territories within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit include: Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam,
Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, North Marianna Islands, Oregon, and Washington.
2 See id. at 1052.
3 Id. at 1050.
4 Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, No. CV-05-283-S-BLW, 2005 WL 2847390, at *1 (D.
Idaho Oct. 28, 2005).
5 1d. at 1051.
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and the justifications for discriminatory policies presented
would better serve the purposes of the Fair Housing Act. 6
I.

491
10

Part IV

THE FAIR HOUSING ACT

The Fair Housing Act was created to ensure that housing decisions
would be free of discrimination. At its creation, though, it was not a very
effective response to housing discrimination, and the scope of the
protection it offers developed over a long period. The Act's long
gestation was due, in part, to the initial absence of an enforcement
mechanisms, but also to ambiguities, such as uncertainty about the
applicability of the Act to homeless shelters. While an enforcement
mechanism has long been part of the Act, courts continue to struggle,
four decades after the Act was created, to define the scope of the
protections it provides.
In April of 1968, Congress passed the Fair Housing Act ("FHA") as
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 7 Prior to the passage of the
FHA, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 addressed the rampant racial
discrimination against former slaves. 8 The 1866 Act could have created
a policy of fair housing; however, it lacked any federal enforcement
provisions. 9 Then, in 1948, in the landmark case Shelley v. Kraemer, the
Supreme Court declared that private racially restrictive housing
covenants are invalid.1O Despite the Supreme Court's holding, racebased discrimination continued. 11 The Civil Rights Act of 1964
attempted to address the problem but again included no enforcement
provisions. 12 Finally, in the midst of the civil rights movement and in the
wake of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s death, President Lyndon Johnson
urged Congress to pass the FHA. 13 Congress responded by enacting
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which included meaningful
enforcement mechanisms to prevent housing discrimination. 14

6 The scope of this Note is limited to the issue of justifications for policies which are facially
discriminatory under the Fair Housing Act and does not discuss disparate impact claims or
Establishment Clause issues addressed in the opinion.
742 U.S.C.A § 3601 et seq. (Westlaw 2008).
8 See H. R. REP. No. 100-711, at 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2176.
9 H. R. REP. No. 100-711, at 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2175.
JO Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,20-21 (1948).
II See H. R. REP. No. 100-711, at 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,2175.
12
/d .
13
1d.
14 {d. Some examples of the Act's enforcement mechanisms include precise identifications
of outlawed housing discrimination, authorizing the Department of Housing and Urban Development
to take prompt judicial action against a violator, and the usage of Administrative Law Judges to
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PROVISIONS AND GOALS OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT

The FHA's purpose is to ensure fair housing for all individuals
throughout the United States and to end discrimination against protected
classes of persons based on prejudice, stereotypes or ignorance in the
provision of housing. 15 Ending housing discrimination is part of
Congress's larger commitment to end the exclusion of protected classes
from the American mainstream. 16 Protected classes of persons are those
who are discriminated against on the basis of race, color, religion,
gender, familial status or national origin.17 The FHA prohibits actions
against protected persons including refusing to sell, rent or lease;
refusing to negotiate; making a unit unavailable; and imposing policies
or procedures because a person is a member of a protected class. 18
B.

THE FAIR HOUSING ACT As APPLIED To HOMELESS SHELTERS

In passing the FHA, Congress did not explicitly address homeless
shelters or whether the Act would apply to them. 19 The Act simply states
that it applies to a dwelling which is defined as "any building, structure,
or portion thereof which is occupied as ... a residence by one or more
families.,,20 Thus, whether the FHA applies to homeless shelters and
other temporary lodging is an issue that courts have struggled with and
that has been debated since shortly after the FHA's passage. 21 The
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue, but several courts have
extended the FHA's provisions to homeless shelters. 22 The factors a
oversee FHA claims.
15 42 U.S.C.A. § 3601 (Westlaw 2008); see Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491,
1504 (lOth Cir. 1995).
16
Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1504.
17 [d. As passed in 1968, the Act protected persons from discrimination based on race, color,
religion, and national origin. In 1974, Congress amended the Act to include gender as a prohibited
basis of discrimination. Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808(b)(I), 88 Stat. 633, 729 (1974). Additionally,
Congress amended the Act in 1988 to prohibit discrimination based on handicap and familial status
(e.g., having children in the home). Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(b), 102 Stat. 1619, 1622 (1988).
18 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604 (Westlaw 2008).
19 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3602(b) (Westlaw 2008). Section 3602 includes the statute's definition
of a "dwelling," in which Congress outlined the places that are subject to the provisions of the Fair
Housing Act. This section is devoid of any reference to homeless shelters, transient lodging, or
anything of this sort.
20 42 U.S.C.A. §3602(b) (Westlaw 2008).
21 HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LmGATION § 9:2 (West 2007); I HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION PRACTICE MANUAL § 2: 14 (West 2007).
22 See Red Bull Assocs. v. Best Western In!'l, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Fair
Housing Act assumed to apply to motel providing long-term lodging to homeless persons), affd, 862
F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988); Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169, 1173-74 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (homeless
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court uses to decide whether temporary lodging is a "dwelling," as
defined by the FHA, are whether the occupants remain for more than a
brief period of time and whether they view their space or room as a place
to which they will return. 23 The Ninth Circuit has held that a homeless
shelter qualifies as a "dwelling" under the FHA, and it has extended the
FHA's protections to inhabitants or would-be inhabitants of homeless
shelters, including individuals and families. 24
II.

THE MANY APPROACHES To FACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY POLICYY

JUSTIFICATIONS
While Community House was the first time the Ninth Circuit
addressed facially discriminatory policies within the realm of the FHA,
other circuits had previously addressed the issue. The past few decades
have seen multiple tests for determining whether a defendant has
sufficient justification for a policy that, on its face, treats certain people
differently (a facially discriminatory policy) and the result has been
varying degrees of flexibility.
Because the Supreme Court has not addressed what justifies facially
discriminatory policies under the FHA, many courts turn to Title VII
employment discrimination cases for guidance in the FHA context. Prior
to the Community House decision, the Ninth Circuit applied a burdenshifting test to all FHA cases, including claims of facial discrimination
and discriminatory impact, which it adopted from a United States
Supreme Court decision in an employment-discrimination case. 25 This
burden-shifting test requires a plaintiff to present a prima facie case of
discrimination?6 A prima facie case under the Fair Housing Act consists
of the following: (I) that the plaintiff is a member of one of the Act's
protected classes, (2) that the plaintiff applied for and was qualified for
housing which is covered by the Act, (3) that the plaintiffs housing
application was rejected, and (4) that openings remained after plaintiff
27
was rejected. If a plaintiff successfully presents a prima facie case of
shelter is a "dwelling" under the Fair Housing Act); Project B.A.S.I.C. v. City of Providence, Civ. A
No. 89-248P, 1990 WL 429846, at *4 (D.R.1. Apr. 25, 1990) (homeless shelters covered). But see
Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. I, 4 (D.D.C. 1991) (questioning whether emergency overnight
shelter for homeless can be characterized as a "dwelling" within the meaning of the Fair Housing
Act).
23 HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 9:2 (West 2007) (citing United States
v. Hughes Mem'l Home, 396 F.Supp 544 (W.D. Va. 1975)).
24 Turning Point, Inc. v. City of Caldwell, 74 F.3d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1996).
2S See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
26
See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
27 1d.
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discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant to produce
evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the policy?8 If a
defendant produces a nondiscriminatory reason, the burden finally shifts
back to the plaintiff to prove that defendant's given reason is merely a
pretext. 29 However, in its Community House decision, the Ninth Circuit
took a more rigid approach to facially discriminatory policies,
eliminating the burden-shifting test and allowing exceptions only for
safety concerns and actually beneficial policies. 3D
The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, has applied a more flexible
3l
test. It allows for certain reasonable exceptions, such as policies which
further legitimate governmental interests that cannot be achieved in less
discriminatory ways.32
Since the 1970's, the Eighth Circuit has employed an approach
similar to a constitutional equal-protection analysis, first requiring a
plaintiff to show a prima facie case of discrimination. 33 It then requires
the defendant to demonstrate that its conduct was necessary to promote a
"legitimate governmental interest" and that the behavior was "rationally
related" to that legitimate governmental interest. 34
A.

THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH IN TITLE VII EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES

There are no Supreme Court cases that address justifications for
facially discriminatory policies in the context of FHA claims. As a
result, many courts, including the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, have turned
to Title VII employment-discrimination cases for guidance on how to
proceed in the FHA context.
In UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the Supreme Court addressed a
defendant's justification for a facially discriminatory policy in an
employment context. 35 The Court outlined the approach for situations

28

[d.

29 See Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 FJd 300, 305 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test to plaintiffs' claim that defendant city discriminated against
them in a zoning ordinance that disallowed plaintiffs from constructing a housing complex for
physically disabled elderly adults).
30 Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 FJd 1041, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2007).
31 Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 FJd 1491, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995).

32

[d.

33 Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 77 FJd 249 (8th Cir. 1996); Familystyle of St. Paul,
Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91, 94 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. City of Black Jack,
508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).

34

[d.

35

UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
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where an employer's policy is discriminatory on its face, which is
different than situations where an employer's policy is neutral on its face
but is alleged to have a disparate, discriminatory impact. 36
In Johnson Controls, the employer's policy barred all women,
except those whose infertility was medically documented, from jobs
involving lead exposure. 37 The Supreme Court concluded that the policy
was facially discriminatory because it explicitly discriminated against
women based on their gender?8 The Court held that the appropriate test
was whether the policy was justified by Title VII's bona fide
occupational qualification exception. 39 The bona fide occupational
qualification exception allows an employer to discriminate on the basis
of religion, sex, or national origin "in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business
or enterprise.,,40 The Court concluded that Johnson Controls' policy did
not fit within Title VII's bona fide occupational qualification exception,
because the distinction between employee's based on gender was not
necessary to the normal operation of the business and therefore violated
Title VII. 41

B.

THE SUPREME COURT'S McDONNELL DOUGLAS TEST

The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test was developed in 1973
in an employment-discrimination action,42 and it has been continuously
applied by the Supreme Court in employment-discrimination cases 43 and
by federal courts of appeals in FHA claims. 44

[d. at 211.
37 [d. at 200.
38 [d. at 197.
36

39 [d. at 200. The bona fide occupational qualification exception ("BFOQ") is a defense to an
employer's sex-based discrimination. A BFOQ is a quality, skill, aptitude, or condition that is
necessary for an employee to possess in order to be able to perform the necessary functions of the
position. Many courts consider a BFOQ defense or other defenses written into Title VII, as there are
no Supreme Court decisions as to justifications or defenses to discriminatory actions within the Fair
Housing Act context.
40 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 2007).
41 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 211.
42 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 794 (1973).
43 See Texas Dep't ofCmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (applying McDonnell
Douglas test to a female former employee's employment-discrimination suit against her former
employer alleging that she was denied a promotion and was terminated because of her sex).
44 See Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 FJd 300, 305 (9th Cir. 1997) (plaintiffs claimed
city's zoning ordinance discriminated against low-income housing for disabled elderly population);
see also Soules v. HUD, 967 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying the test to plaintiffs claim that
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McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green "involved "an AfricanAmerican civil rights activist who was discharged by his employer,
McDonnell Douglas. 45 After being laid off, Green engaged in disruptive
and illegal activities against his former employer to protest his
employer's allegedly racially discriminatory hiring practices. 46 Shortly
thereafter, McDonnell Douglas advertised that it was looking for
qualified personnel, and Green applied for a position with his former
employer but was not hired. 47 Green then sued McDonnell Douglas,
claiming it discriminated against him on the basis of race. 48 He argued
that this racial discrimination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which prohibits the consideration of race in any employment
decision and prohibits discrimination against employees who attempt to
correct allegedly discriminatory employer practices. 49 The Court
developed a burden-shifting test to determine whether impermissible
discrimination has occurred. 50
The McDonnell Douglas test is a three-part burden-shifting test. 51 It
first requires that a plaintiff present a prima facie case of
discrimination. 52 If a plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the burden of
production shifts to the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory
reason for the action at issue. 53 If the defendant offers an acceptable
reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the reason is merely a pretext for
discrimination. 54
In Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, the Supreme Court applied the
McDonnell Douglas test to an employment case .55 It found that the
plaintiff met his initial burden of presenting a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing that he was not re-hired by his employer
because of a perceived drug addiction disability. 56 The Court then turned

a real estate agent's denial of housing to plaintiff because she had a 12-year-old daughter violated
the FHA).
45
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794.
ld .
47 Id. at 796.
48
1d.

46

1d.
SOld. at 802.

49

51 Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041, 1053 (9thCir. 2007) (citing McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04).
52
1d.
53 1d .
54 ld .
55
56

See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 50 (2003).
Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 50.
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to determining whether there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
behind the defendant's policy of not rehiring employees who were
terminated because of misconduct. 57 The Court concluded the policy
was legitimate and non-discriminatory, and remanded the case for the
lower court to perform the remainder of the analysis. 58
In Soules v. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, the Second
Circuit applied the test in an FHA claim, and first found that the plaintiff
established a prima facie discrimination case by demonstrating that she
was denied housing once she revealed that she had a young daughter. 59
However, the court held that the landlord's explanation that the plaintiff
was aggressive and combative was not pretext, as evidenced by witness
testimony and the fact that the landlord did offer the apartment to another
family with children. 60 Therefore, the court held there was no violation
because the landlord's actions were legitimate and nondiscriminatory.61
C.

THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S TEST

The Tenth Circuit uses a flexible test 10 which the court makes
allowances for discriminatory policies in some situations. It weighs the
harm to those affected by the alleged discrimination against the benefit,
if any, to those persons and the community as a whole. The test does not
foreclose the possibility of justifiable discriminatory policies, including
safety exceptions outlined specifically in the FHA and those exceptions
that actually create a benefit for the persons affected. '
In Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., the plaintiff was a disabled man
who lived at a group home in Orem, Idaho, in an area zoned for singlefamily residential housing. 62 Within this zone, the City of Orem allowed
different types of residences, such as nursing homes, foster-family care
homes, convents, and homes for the mentally and physically
handicapped. 63 However, only group homes for the disabled were
required to obtain conditional-use permits. 64 Mr. Bangerter's group
1d. at 53.54.
1d.
59 Soules v. HUD, 967 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1992).
60 /d. at 823.
61 /d. at 825.26.
62 Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1494 (10th Cir. 1995).
63 1d .
64 /d. Conditional-use permits, or special-use permits, are granted by a zoning board and
authorize special uses of property as exceptions to the relevant zoning ordinance. Unlike a variance
which is an authorized violation of a zoning ordinance, a conditional use permit is a recognized
exception to established zoning regulations. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (deluxe 7th ed. 1999)
(defining "special use permit").
57

58
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home was granted a permit that was subject to additional conditions not
imposed on other types of group homes within the zoning area, including
24-hour supervision of the residents and the creation of a community
advisory committee for the oversight of community concerns and
complaints. 65 Mr. Bangerter alleged that the permit violated the Fair
Housing Act because it treated disabled persons differently than nondisabled persons and because this differential treatment was detrimental
to disabled persons. 66
The District Court for the District of Utah applied a rational-basis
test similar to that used by the Eighth Circuit which requires that a policy
be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 67 The court
found that the permit restrictions did not violate the FHA since they were
rationally related to the legitimate government interest of integrating
disabled persons into the community.68 Mr. Bangerter appealed the
district court's ruling, arguing that it erred in holding that the challenged
ordinance did not violate the FHA simply because its "legitimate"
purpose was to integrate the disabled into "normal" surroundings. 69
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court
utilized the wrong legal standard because the traditional burden-shifting
test is only appropriate in disparate impact claims. 70 Mr. Bangerter's
claim was one of intentional discrimination, because the ordinance,
which treated group homes for the disabled differently from other group
homes, was discriminatory on its face.71 The court did not require the
plaintiff to present a prima facie case of discrimination because the
ordinance was facially discriminatory.72 The Tenth Circuit looked to the
plain language of the FHA to find acceptable justifications for such
facially discriminatory statutes,73 as did the Supreme Court in Johnson
Controls when it looked to the plain language of Title VII.74 The Tenth

65

Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1495.
66 ld. at 1496.
67
1d.
68
69

ld. at 1496-97.
!d. at 1497.

70 !d. at 1500. The Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration
of Bangerter's claim of violations of the FHA and for consideration of the City of Orem's
justifications for the discriminatory actions. The Tenth Circuit also remanded the case because of
the district court's improper use of a rational-basis test in considering the conduct of the City of
Orem under the FHA. Upon remand, the case was dismissed by the district court pursuant to an
agreement of the parties.
71
1d.
72

!d.

73

!d. at 1503.

74

See UAW v . Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
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Circuit noted that the FHA itself allows for reasonable restrictions when
based on legitimate safety concerns. 75 The court also looked to Title VII
for additional guidance and found provISIOns allowing some
discriminatory policies within an employment context, such as the safety
exception applied in McDonnell Douglas. 76 It also considered the
Supreme Court's interpretations of those Title VII provisions. 77 Taking
note of the exceptions allowed in employment-discrimination cases,78 the
court stated that "actually beneficial" restrictions might also be
allowed. 79
The court determined that the first permissible justification for a
facially discriminatory restriction is that it may be benign, meaning the
policy is actually beneficial (whether already realized or not), rather than
burdensome, to those it targets for differential treatment. 80 If the policy's
benefit clearly outweighs the burden placed on those differentially
treated, the discriminatory restriction may be justified. 81 For example, if
a policy expands housing opportunities for protected classes of persons,
promotes the FHA's goal of independent living for minorities and the
disabled, and is not based on stereotypes or prejudice, the policy can be
characterized as actually beneficial and be upheld. 82
The second justification authorized by the court is a facially
discriminatory restriction whose purpose is rooted in legitimate safety
concerns. 83 The FHA explicitly states that discrimination is justified
when extending housing to a specific individual or family constitutes a
direct threat to the health or safety of others. 84 However, the court held
that discriminatory restrictions predicated on public health or safety must
be narrowly tailored to specific concerns about individual residents and
cannot be based on prejudice or generalized stereotypes. 85 The court
explained that a discriminatory policy that singles out disabled persons

1d. (citing 42 U.S.c. §3604(f)(9».
Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1503-04 (10th Cir. 1995) (For example, U[iln
the employment discrimination context, the Supreme Court has held that Title VII's bar on all
discrimination on the basis of race should not be read literally.")
77 Id.; see also Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 204.
78 Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing 42 U.S.c. §
3604(f)(2»; see also Morgan v. HUD, 985 F.2d 1451, 1456 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1993).
79
Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1504.
80 Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995).
81 Id. at 1504-05.
82 1d .
75

76

83

Id. at 1503.

84

/d. at 1503 (citing 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(9».

td. at 1503 (citing Elliott v. City of Athens, Ga., 960 F.2d 975, 978 (11th Cir. 1992) and
H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, I OOth Cong., 2d Sess., at 24, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2185).
85

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 6

500

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

for specific treatment based on concerns for public safety must be
'''individualiz[ed] ... to the needs or abilities of particular kinds of
developmental disabilities,' and must have a 'necessary correlation to the
actual abilities of the persons upon whom it is imposed.',,86 In other
words, if a community places restrictions on disabled occupants, those
restrictions must address the specific nature of the targeted disability and
the disabled resident against whom the restriction is placed.
D.

THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S TEST

In both 1991 and 1996, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed which standard should apply to facially discriminatory policies
under the FHA. 87 In Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, the
court held that certain state and local zoning ordinances that were applied
to facilities for mentally challenged or mentally ill persons did not
violate the FHA. 88 Familystyle of St. Paul, an organization providing
rehabilitative services to mentally ill persons and operating a group home
in St. Paul, Minnesota, applied for a special-use permit to increase the
number of occupants in its group home, but was granted only a
temporary conditional-use permit. 89 Since Familystyle's facilities at that
time were concentrated within a one-and-a-half-block radius, the
conditional-use permit required that Familystyle work to disperse its
facilities in order to attempt to integrate the disabled residents with other
community residents. 9o Familystyle challenged the conditional-use
permit as a violation of the FHA, contending that the dispersal
requirements were imposed only on facilities for disabled persons. 91 The
Eighth Circuit held that despite discrimination against disabled persons
and any burden imposed on them by enforcement of zoning ordinances,
the city had not violated the FHA. 92 The court applied a test similar to a
constitutional equal-protection analysis, requiring only that the
challenged actions have a rational relation to a legitimate government

86 Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503-04 (citing Mabrunak, Inc. v. City of Snow, Ohio, 974 F.2d 43,
47 (6th Cir. 1992) and Potomac Group Home v. Montgomery County, Md., 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1300
(D. Md. 1993)).
87 Familystyle of SI. Paul, Inc. v. City of SI. Paul, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991); Oxford
House-C v. City ofSI. Louis, 77 F.3d 249 (8th Cir. 1996).
88 Familystyle, 923 F.2d at 94.
89/d. at 92.
90

/d.

91/d.

92 /d. at 94.
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interest. 93 Concluding that the regulations at issue in Familysty/e met
those requirements, the court upheld the discriminatory applications of
the regulations. 94
In Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals again held that a discriminatory zoning restriction applied to
group homes for disabled persons did not violate the FHA. 95 Oxford
House, a group home for recovering alcoholics and drug addicts, was
located in an area zoned for single-family dwellings, allowing for homes
having eight or fewer unrelated residents. 96 After the city cited Oxford
House for having ten residents, the group home challenged the city's
enforcement of the restriction, alleging an FHA violation. 97 The Eighth
Circuit again applied an equal-protection analysis and found that the
zoning restrictions were rationally related to a legitimate government
interest and therefore did not violate the FHA. 98
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S MAJORITY OPINION IN COMMUNITY HOUSE,
INC. V. CITY OF BOISE

The Community House plaintiffs sued the City of Boise, Idaho,
because they were forced to leave a homeless shelter that closed its doors
to women and families but continued to offer services to men. 99 The
plaintiffs asserted that this action was discrimination in violation of the
FHA. 100 The Idaho District Court refused to grant a preliminary
injunction requiring the plaintiffs' return to the facility. 101 The plaintiffs
then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which held that the district court

93 [d. The Plaintiffs argued that the dispersal requirement violated the FHA because it limited
the housing opportunities for the mentally disabled. The government argued that the dispersal
requirement was necessary to promote the deinstitutionalization of the disabled. The court found the
dispersal requirement furthered the state's legitimate interest in deinstitutionalizing the mentally ill.
94 [d. at 95.

95

Oxford House, 77 F.3d at 253.

[d. at 250-51.
97 [d. at 251.

96

98 [d. at 252. The district court found that Oxford House's financial viability would be in
jeopardy if it were limited to only eight residents. The plaintiffs argued that the restrictions were
applied to them because of their handicap. The Eighth Circuit found the city's interest in limiting
traffic, congestion, and noise was reasonably related to the occupant restriction on Oxford House and
other residential homes, and the court upheld the restriction. Contributing to the failure of the
plaintiffs' claims was their inability to prove that the city treated Oxford House any differently than
other residents in the same zoning area.
99 Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, No. CV -05-283-S-BLW, 2005 WL 2847390, at *1-*2
(D. Idaho Oct. 28, 2005).
100 [d. at *3.
101 [d. at *I.
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abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard and denying
..
. \02
the InJunctIon.
In the early 1990s, Community House, Inc., a nonprofit
organization, and the City of Boise, Idaho, together operated a homeless
shelter and low-income housing for the community's indigent
population. \03
Community House provided housing for homeless
individuals and families, as well as long-term low-income housing units
and long-term single-resident-occupancy units. 104 Community House
also provided long-term housing and services for the severely disabled. \05
In 2004, the City of Boise assumed control and management of
Community House. 106 The City of Boise then leased the former
Community House facility to the Boise Rescue Mission Ministries
("BRMM"), a Christian nonprofit organization. \07
BRMM's ideology and management style is based in what it claims
are Christian principles. \08 The organization has a history of segregating
homeless men from women and segregating homeless single individuals
from homeless families. 109 Upon the takeover by BRMM, Community
House stopped adding names to its waiting list, and everyone residing at
Community House was forced to leave. llo However, since BRMM
planned on continuing to operate the former Community House facility
as a male-only facility, men were permitted to reapply for housing at the
facility through BRMM.lll Many of the former residents of Community
House, mostly women and children, were left living in parks, cars, or at a
local reservoir. 112
In 2005, Community House, Inc., together with several disabled
individuals and a family who had previously resided at Community
House, sued the City of Boise. ll3 They sought a preliminary injunction
to enjoin the City of Boise from removing them from Community
House. 1I4 The plaintiffs also wanted the injunction to command that the
Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9thCir. 2007).
[d. at 1045.
II» [d.
105 [d.

102
103

106

[d.

107

[d.

108 Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, No. CV-05-283-S-BLW, 2005 WL 2847390, at *2 (D.
Idaho Oct. 28, 2005).
109 [d. at *2.
110 [d.
III [d.

112
113

Appellants' Opening Appellate Brief, 2006 WL 2952501 (C.A.9) at pg. 10.
Cmty. House, 2005 WL 2847390 at *3.

114ld.
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former residents be reinstated. I 15 To obtain an injunction, an applicant
must show a likelihood of success on the merits" of the case and "a
possibility of irreparable injury," or the moving party must show "the
existence of serious questions [as to] the merits and the balance of
hardships tipping in the moving party's favor," a likelihood of success on
the merits" of the case and "a possibility of irreparable injury," or the
moving party must show "the existence of serious questions [as to] the
merits and the balance of hardships tipping in the moving party's
favor.,,116 The plaintiffs's appeal to the Ninth Circuit revolved around
what was required to show a serious question as to success on the merits.
They argued that in determining whether a serious question existed, the
district court applied the wrong legal standard. 117 The plaintiffs offered

IIS

1d.

116 Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2007). The plaintiffs
sought a preliminary injunction, which is distinct from a permanent injunction. To obtain a
preliminary injunction, "the moving party must show a likelihood of success on the merits" of the
case and "a possibility of irreparable injury," or the moving party must show "the existence of
serious questions [as to] the merits and the balance of hardships tipping in the moving party's favor."
Compare A Choice for Women v. Butterworth, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1154 (S.D. Fla. 1998). A
permanent injunction requires (I) success on the merits, (2) a showing that the permanent injunction
is necessary to prevent irreparable harm, (3) a showing that the potential injury outweighs the
potential harm of the injunction, and (4) a showing that the permanent injunction serves the public
interest. ld. at 1154. "The standard for a preliminary injunction is essentially the same as for a
permanent injunction with the exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the
merits rather than actual success." Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531,
546 n.12 (1987). Therefore, the standard of proof in order to obtain a preliminary injunction is lower
than the standard for a permanent injunction. Here, the district court denied the preliminary
injunction because it concluded that the plaintiffs had not raised a serious question of discrimination.
Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, No. CV.Q5-283-S-BLW, 2005 WL 2847390, at *5 (D. Idaho
Oct. 28, 2005). The plaintiffs then appealed, arguing that the district court did not find that the
plaintiffs had raised a serious issue of discrimination because the district court applied the wrong
legal standard and therefore abused its discretion. Cmty. House, 490 F.3d at 1049. The Ninth
Circuit then held that the district court had in fact used the wrong legal standard, and the Ninth
Circuit changed the law that the district court must apply to a request for a preliminary injunction
when a policy is facially discriminatory under the FHA. ld. It then found that the plaintiffs had
raised a serious issue of discrimination because the policy was discriminatory on its face. ld. The
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. ld. Following the
Ninth Circuit decision, the parties settled their dispute and the issue of whether the city's actions
were permissibly justified was not actually litigated. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit did not indicate
whether the new legal standard applied in Community House applies to requests for permanent
injunctions. [d. For the purposes of this article, it is assumed that the same legal standard is applied
to both preliminary and permanent injunctions when a policy or action is facially discriminatory
under the FHA.
117 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). An action based on a
violation of the FHA (as opposed to in an employment-discrimination context) requires the
following: (I) that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, (2) that the plaintiff applied for and
was qualified for the housing covered under the FHA, (3) that the plaintiff s housing application was
rejected, and (4) that openings remained after plaintiff was rejected. ld.
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evidence showing that men were permitted to reapply to Community
House (now then run by BRMM), whereas women and families were
not, a facially discriminatory policy that favored men. 1I8 In response, the
defendants argued that the policy was necessitated by safety concerns
because more violent incidents occurred when the occupants were comingled. 1I9 Additionally, and more significantly, the defendants argued
that the policy was necessary in order for them to transfer the men from
another facility, Boise Rescue Mission, to the former Community House
facility in order to renovate Boise Rescue Mission into more housing for
women and children, thereby doubling the facilities available to the
homeless and low-income population of the city. 120
The United States District Court for the District of Idaho denied the
plaintiffs' motion for an injunction to require the return of the former
residents to the shelter based on its application of the McDonnell
Douglas test. 121 In applying the McDonnell Douglas test, the trial court
was persuaded by the justifications offered by the defendants and found
that "the plaintiffs [had] not raised serious questions as to whether [the
city's] justifications satisf[ied] the standards for permissible
discrimination under the Fair Housing ACt.,,122 The plaintiffs appealed
the district court's ruling, asserting that the court abused its discretion in
denying their motion for a preliminary injunction. 123 The plaintiffs
asserted that BRMM's men-only policy violated the FHA. 124 The Ninth
Circuit, after purportedly applying the Tenth Circuit's test, held that the
district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction requiring BRMM to reinstate the former residents
of Community House. 125

lIS

119

Cmty. House, 2005 WL 2847390 at *5.
[d.

120 [d. The Idaho court specifically noted that in reopening Community House only to men,
the city made a policy decision to trade short-term hardship for long-term gain. The court also noted
that the men-only policy looks less like discrimination and more like a necessary condition in order
to increase shelter space for women and families.
121 Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9thCir. 2007).
l22 [d. at lOS!.

Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 468 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006).
Cmty. House, 490 F.3d at 1045.
125 [d. at 1052. A panel of three appellate judges decided this case. Judge David R. Thompson
wrote the majority opinion.
123

124
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THE McDONNELL DOUGLAS TEST DOES NOT APPLY WHEN A
POLICY Is FACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY

The Ninth Circuit in Community House concluded that the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting tese 26 does not apply when
analyzing facially discriminatory policies because there is no need to
probe for a discriminatory motive when the statute or policy is
127
discriminatory on its face.
The court instead applied the test used by
the Tenth Circuit, which allowed some justifications for facially
discriminatory policies. 128 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that in light of the
Supreme Court's recognition of justifications for facially discriminatory
acts in analogous Title VII employment-discrimination cases, as outlined
in Johnson Controls, an approach that allows justifications under the
FHA is appropriate. 129 It also held that the Tenth Circuit's test applied to
the Johnson Controls approach. 130 Johnson Controls stated that in cases
where there is direct evidence of a facially discriminatory policy, the
discrimination is presumed and the defendant bears the burden of proof
that the policy is exempted in some way.131
B.

INTENTIONAL DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT CAN BE JUSTIFIED By
LEGITIMATE SAFETY CONCERNS OR By ACTUALLY BENEFICIAL
DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS

In addition to holding that McDonnell Douglas did not apply to the
plaintiffs claim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Community
House stated that a plaintiff challenging a facially discriminatory policy
must show that a protected group has been subjected to clearly
differential and discriminatory treatment to establish a prima facie
case. 132 However, a defendant may justify intentionally discriminatory
treatment under the FHA if it can show that the policy is based on an
exception. 133

See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802 (1973).
Cmty. House, 490 F.3d at 1049.
128 Id. at 1050.
129
1d.
126

127

130

Id.

UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,200 (1991) ("For the plaintiff to bear the
burden of proof in a case in which there is direct evidence of a facially discriminatory policy is
wholly inconsistent with settled Title VII law").
132 Cmty. House, 490 F.3d at 1050.
133 1d. at 1050 ("This is not to say that a government can never justify any intentional
differential treatment of the handicapped [under the FHAJ. Some differential treatment may be
objectively legitimate.... Even though the language of the Ordinance singles out individuals for
131
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The Ninth Circuit considered other circuits' approaches in
determining what standard to apply to a defendant's justification for a
facially discriminatory policy under the FHA and found in favor of the
test used by the Tenth Circuit. 134 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
Eighth Circuit's application of an equal protection test was improper
because certain classes of persons, such as families and the handicapped,
are specifically protected by the FHA, where they are not under equal
protection jurisprudence. 135 The Community House court held that in
order for it to allow a facially discriminatory policy to proceed, a
defendant must show either that the restriction is in fact beneficial as
against the protected class, or that the restriction responds to legitimate
safety concerns, which are not based on stereotypes. 136 The Community
House court concluded that the Tenth Circuit's approach was more in
line with the Supreme Court's approach in Johnson Controls. 137
To justify their discrimination, the defendants' in Community House
asserted that the former Community House facility would be converted
into a shelter for women and children in the future. 138 The defendants
also contended that they were concerned about the safety of the residents,
as the cohabitation of genders had caused problems for them in the
past. 139 In light of the test adopted from the Tenth Circuit, the
Community House court rejected the City'S justifications because they
did not promote legitimate safety concerns or presently actually
beneficial effects. l40 The court found that the city did not produce
enough evidence to support its claim that the discriminatory policies at
Community House protected the safety of the other residents or the

discriminatory treatment based on their familial status and handicap, a proper justification can
legitimize the different treatment and validate the Ordinance." (quoting Bangerter v. Orem City
Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, ISOI n.l7 (10th Cir. 1995) and Children's Alliance v. City of Bellevue, 9S0 F.
Supp. 1491, 1497 (W.O. Wash. 1997))).
134 Id. at IOS0.
135

Cmty. House, 490 F.3d at IOS0; see Bangerter, 46 F.3d at IS03 ("The use of an Equal
Protection analysis is misplaced here because this case involves a federal statute and not the
Fourteenth Amendment. ... [Aj plaintiffs 'inability to properly assert a right under the Fourteenth
Amendment is not of concern when examining [the plaintiffs] claims brought pursuant to the Fair
Housing Act.' Moreover, the FHAA specifically makes the handicapped a protected class for
purposes of a statutory claim-they are the direct object of the statutory protection--even if they are
not a protected class for constitutional purposes." (citation omitted)).
136 Cmty. House, 490 F.3d at IOS0 (citing Larkin v. Michigan Dep't of Soc. Servs., 89 F.3d
28S, 290 (6th Cir. 1996) and Bangerter, 46 F.3d at IS03).
137
1d.
138 Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, No. CV-OS-283-S-BLW, 200S WL 2847390, at *S (D.
Idaho Oct. 28, 200S).
139
ld .
140

Cmty. House, 490 F.3d at IOS2.
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community. 141 The court also found that even if the city planned to build
another facility, the city had not presented a definitive time period as to
the displacement or the return of the plaintiffs. 142 Therefore, the court
found the city's justifications insufficient. 143
IV. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION OF THE TEST To
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A FACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY POLICY Is
MORE CONSISTENT WITH THE FAIR HOUSING ACT THAN THE
NINTH CIRCUIT' S APPLICATION
The approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit enVISIOns only two
acceptable justifications for a defendant's facially discriminatory acts:
exceptions rooted in legitimate safety concerns and those where the
discrimination is currently actually beneficial to the plaintiff. While the
decision did not establish how broadly the exceptions may be construed,
the court's treatment of the uncertainty of the alleged benefits to the
Community House plaintiffs suggests that the exceptions will not be
broadly applied (at this time). While the Ninth Circuit never reached the
issue of whether the Community House defendants violated the FHA, the
court recognized only narrow exceptions that would allow facial
discrimination to be permissible. Not all circuits, however, agree with
the Ninth Circuit approach and have adopted more flexible tests for
determining when facial discrimination violates the FHA. Such an
approach gives courts greater ability to uphold technically discriminatory
acts that have the effect of promoting the goals of the FHA.
The Tenth Circuit recognized that one of Congress's objectives in
enacting the FHA was to extend equal housing opportunities to protected
classes of persons. 144 In its analysis of potential justifications for facially
discriminatory housing policies, the Tenth Circuit allowed for housing
changes which were actually beneficial, even if only beneficial in the
future. 145 Although the Ninth Circuit expressly adopted the Tenth
Circuit's test, its application of the test differs from that of the Tenth
Circuit.
The Community House decision effectively barred an
opportunity to put the goals of Community House-and in turn, the
FHA-into effect by denying the defendants an opportunity to develop a

Id. at 1051.
Id. at 1052.
143 [d.
141

142

144

[d. at 1504.

145

Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995).
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facility in the future. l46 The Tenth Circuit's flexible application of the
test, allowing justifications for discriminatory policies based on a caseby-case basis rather than a blanket rule, more accurately reflects the
goals of the FHA. The Ninth Circuit's application of the test, by
contrast, disregards the nuances of the test and considers only two
exceptions because the FHA's paramount purpose is to extend and
encourage expansion of housing to its protected classes of persons, rather
than to foreclose such opportunities for communities. As the Second
Circuit has observed, a test that weighs the adverse impact on the persons
discriminated against as opposed to the proposed justifications for the
discrimination is more likely to serve the purposes of the FHA. 147
A.

THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S TEST REFLECTS THE GOALS OF THE FAIR
HOUSING ACT

The Tenth Circuit's flexible application of the test more accurately
reflects the purpose of the FHA because flexibility creates the possibility
for finding more solutions in addressing housing discrimination. 148
Congress's intent to provide for fair housing through the FHA, as
interpreted by the Tenth Circuit, is not without limitation. 149 First, the
FHA expressly allows for discrimination justified by legitimate safety
concerns. 150 The FHA specifically recognizes that a protected person
who constitutes a direct threat to the health and safety of others does not
warrant the FHA's protections, and therefore the Act does not require the
offering of housing to an individual who poses a true threat to the safety
of the people in the community. 151
Second, the Tenth Circuit requires that restrictions based on safety
concerns be narrowly tailored and not based on stereotypes. 152 The
FHA's legislative history reveals that Congress intended to eliminate the

146

Cmty. House, 490 F.3d at 1060.
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936 (2d Cir. 1988),
affd, 488 U.S. IS (1988) (per curiam).
148
Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1505.
149 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3601 (Westlaw 2008) (noting that fair housing under the Act is limited
by constitutional provisions); see also 42 U.S.c.A. § 3604(0(9) (Westlaw 2008) ("Nothing in this
subsection requires that a dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would
constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in
substantial physical damage to the property of others").
ISO
42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(0(9) (Westlaw 2008).
151
Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503; see also 42 U.S.c.A. § 3604(0(9) (Westlaw 2008).
152 Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1504; see Elliott v. City of Athens, Ga., 960 F.2d 975,978 (11th Cir.
1992) (holding that an exemption may apply, but noting that any exemptions to the protections of the
FHA are to be construed narrowly).
147
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use of ignorance or stereotypes in housing policies in favor of treating
protected persons fairly. 153 In Bangerter, the Tenth Circuit found that
there was no evidence to support a conclusion that the plaintiffs
possessed tendencies that were a direct threat to the community and
remanded to the district court the task of discerning whether the
discriminatory policies were narrowly tailored. l54 The basic objective of
the FHA is to extend housing to protected classes of persons and to end
discrimination based on prejudice and ignorance,155 a goal the Tenth
Circuit furthered when it ordered that the district court determine if the
policies were tailored to the specific abilities of the protected persons.
Third, the Tenth Circuit recognizes that discriminatory policies that
are actually beneficial to the protected persons can be justified. 156 For
example, the court analogized beneficial housing policies to those of
race-conscious affIrmative-action programs that expand, rather than
reduce, opportunities for a protected class of persons.157 Additionally,
the court compared facially discriminatory policies to those that are
facially neutral, potentially allowing for the possibility that
discriminatory policies can be justified if there are legitimate interests
furthered by those policies, and no other, less discriminatory ways to
achieve those interests exist. 158 The court stressed the importance of

153 See H.R. Rep. No. 100-711. 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 18, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2173,2179 ("Prohibiting discrimination against individuals [protected under the FHA] is a major
step in changing the stereotypes that have served to exclude them from American life. These persons
have been denied housing because of misperceptions, ignorance, and outright prejudice. The Fair
Housing Act ... is a clear pronouncement of a national commitment to end the unnecessary
exclusion of persons [protected under the FHA] from the American mainstream. It repudiates the use
of stereotypes and ignorance, and mandates that persons [protected under the FHA] be considered as
individuals. Generalized perceptions ... and unfounded speculations about threats to safety are
specifically rejected as grounds to justify exclusion.").
154
Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1504.
155 See H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 13, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2173, 2174 (Congress specifically identified stereotypes and ignorance as creating a situation in
which protected persons are not given the same opportunities as others, and demanded that prejudice
not be a basis for exclusion in a housing context.)
156
Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1504.
157
1d.
158 1d. at 1504-05; see also Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d
926, 936 (2d Cir. 1988) (In the context of facially neutral government actions that have a
discriminatory impact on the handicapped or other groups protected by the Fair Housing Act, courts
have uniformly held that a defendant can justify its conduct despite the discriminatory impact if it
can prove "that its actions furthered, in theory and in practice, a legitimate, bona fide governmental
interest and that no alternative would serve that interest with less discriminatory effect."), affd, 488
U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam).
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flexibility in finding solutions to address discrimination in housing and
specifically to realize Congress's goals as established in the FHA. 159
B.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION OF THE TEST Is INCONSISTENT
WITH THE GOALS OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT

In Community House, BRMM closed its doors to women and
families, and offered services only to men. The Ninth Circuit concluded
that only two justifications for such a facially discriminatory policy are
acceptable. l60 In so doing, the Ninth Circuit eschewed the flexible
approach utilized by the Tenth Circuit, flexibility that was applied by that
court in order to further the legislative intent of the FHA. 161
Additionally, the Community House court disregarded the nuances of the
previously established exceptions.
1.

The Ninth Circuit Considered Only Two Exceptions

Under the Community House approach, in order to justify a facially
discriminatory policy or procedure, a defendant must show either: (l) the
restriction is in fact· not harmful to the protected class, or (2) the
restriction responds to legitimate safety concerns that are not based on
stereotypes. 162 These two exceptions are the only justifications the Ninth
Circuit considered in Community House. 163 The Ninth Circuit did not
allow for additional justifications based on the specific situation of the
parties in Community House, such as the proposed future facility for
women and children. l64 The Ninth Circuit analyzed the City of Boise's
given justifications and dismissed them as illegitimate upon finding they
did not comport with either of the established exceptions, namely that the
facility was not currently actually beneficial. 165 The Ninth Circuit noted
that it might be possible for the City of Boise to establish a legitimate
justification at a later stage in the litigation, but only if it was supported
by evidence of a legitimate safety concern. 166

159

I60
161

Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1505.
Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041, 1051 (9thCir. 2007).
[d. at 1051-52.

162 Cmty. House, 490 F.3d at 1050 (citing Larkin v. Michigan Dep't of Soc. Servs., 89 F.3d
285,290 (6th Cir. 1996) and Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503).
163
Cmty. House, 490 F.3d at 1050.
164 [d. at 1052.
165 [d. at 1051-52.

166

[d.
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The Tenth Circuit's test, however, did not preclude the possibility
of additional legitimate justifications. 167 Indeed, in its inquiry into
potential justifications, the Tenth Circuit noted that the inquiries made
should be based on discrimination against disabled persons-the
protected class in Bangerter-and on other considerations relevant to
that specific case. 168 For example, Mr. Bangerter alleged that the City of
Orem's requirement that there be an advisory committee was
discriminatory, but the court entertained the theory that the committee
might fall within an exception allowing for discrimination in order to
protect the safety of the community.169 The Tenth Circuit did not hold
that the exceptions applied by it were exclusive. 170
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by first evaluating
interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which it
found analogous to provisions within the FHA.171 In Bangerter, the
parties affected by the facially discriminatory policies were disabled
persons.172 Therefore, in order to determine the allowable justifications,
the Bangerter court considered Title VII provisions pertaining to the
safety of and actually beneficial discrimination against protected
individuals, including the bona fide occupational qualification exception,
allowing for discrimination if a person's sex, religion or national origin
are "reasonably necessary" to the normal operation of a business. 173 The
Tenth Circuit's approach was pointedly in response to the specific facts
of the case before it in Bangerter, in that the court's inquiry was directed
at the plaintiffs' unique situation and did not pass on all potential
justifications for any facially discriminatory policy. 174
The Tenth Circuit identified a specific need for flexibility in
creating solutions to the problems addressed by the FHA. 175 The
Bangerter court acknowledged a trend in which courts in the Second and
Seventh Circuits suggested that, despite a discriminatory impact on
protected persons, a defendant can justify its policies if it can prove that
those policies further a legitimate government interest and that no
alternative would serve that purpose with a less discriminatory impact. 176

167

Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503 n.19.

/d. at 1504.
169 [d. at 1504.

168

at 1503 n.l9.
171 /d. at 1503.
J72 [d. at 1494.
170 [d.

173

Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503.
at 1503 n.19.
175 [d. at 1505.
174/d.

176

[d. at 1505 (citing Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 6

512

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

The Tenth Circuit specifically highlighted those decisions that "have left
some room for other policies that restrict minorities in limited ways in
order to foster ... the overarching policies of the FHA.,,177 It was with
this flexibility in mind that the Tenth Circuit evaluated what is needed to
realize the goals of the FHA. 178 The Ninth Circuit did not apply the
Tenth Circuit's test with the flexibility it employed and encouraged. 179
2.

The Ninth Circuit Disregarded the Nuances of the Established
Exceptions

The Tenth Circuit's test allows a justification predicated upon
legitimate safety concerns, so long as those concerns were not based on
stereotypes and so long as they are narrowly tailored to particularized
concerns about individual residents. 180 The Bangerter court said,
"Restrictions that are narrowly tailored to the particular individuals
affected could be acceptable under the [FHA] if the benefit to the
handicapped in their housing opportunities clearly outweighs whatever
burden may result to them.,,181
The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, was not interested in whether the
City of Boise's proffered justifications were narrowly tailored. 182 This
approach fails to allow for flexibility in realizing the objectives of the
FHA. The City of Boise claimed that the BRMM project would not be
able to convert its site into a more beneficial facility without being able
to transfer the men at that facility to the former Community House
site. 183 BRMM's discriminatory policy-to offer housing services only
to men-created a temporary dislocation of some women and families in
order to complete the new facility and fully serve the homeless and low-

(2d Cir. 1988), affd, 488 u.s. 15 (1988) (per curiam)); see S.-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S.
Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Otero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth.,
484 F.2d 1122 (2dCir. 1973).
177 Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1505; see United States v. Starrett City Assocs. 840 F.2d 1096 (2d
Cir. 1988) (stating that race-conscious policies allowed under Title VII are similar to those allowed
under Title VIII's Fair Housing Act, and holding that "although any racial classification is
presumptively discriminatory, a race-conscious affirmative action plan does not necessarily violate
federal constitutional or statutory provisions").
178
Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1505.
179 Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041, 1052 (9thCir. 2007).
180 Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503-04 (citing Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of Stow, Ohio, 974 F.2d 43,
47 (6th Cir. 1992).
181 [d. at 1504.
182 Cmty. House, 490 F.3d at 1051 (remanding to the district court the decision as to the
legitimacy of the City'S proffered safety justification).v
183 [d. at 1052.
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income community.l84 Another short-term disadvantage in order to
support a long-term benefit was contemplated by the Tenth Circuit in
developing its test, namely that an advisory board to oversee the
operations of the facility could aid the acceptance of the disabled
occupants by the community at large. 185 But this approach is absent from
the Ninth Circuit's decision. 186
The Ninth Circuit's stringent application of the test foreclosed an
opportunity for the court to ascertain beneficial housing changes for the
community of Boise, Idaho. BRMM intended to create a separate
facility for those persons displaced from the former Community House
facility, pending the outcome of the litigation.187 The Ninth Circuit's
rejection of the City of Boise's justifications for the men-only policy at
the former Community House facility made it impossible for an
additional facility to be developed. The Congressional goal of expanding
fair housing for protected classes of people, as stated in the FHA, was
not reflected in the Ninth Circuit's Community House decision.
C.

A MORE FLEXffiLE TEST WOULD BETTER REFLECT THE GOALS OF
THE FAIR HOUSING ACT

Rather than apply the Tenth Circuit's test with rigidity, the Ninth
Circuit should have opted for a more flexible approach, as is employed
by other courts of appeals. 188 Two circuits have held that a flexible
approach to and broad interpretation of Title VIII cases is the manner in
which Congress meant for the FHA to be applied. 189 These decisions
have recognized the need for a flexible approach to FHA actions. As the
Second Circuit stated in Huntington Branch NMCP v. Town of
Huntington, if a defendant can prove that "its actions furthered, in theory
ld .
185 Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1505.
186 Cmty. House, 490 F.3d at 1052.
187 1d. at 1052.
188 Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936 (2d Cir. 1988)
("in the end there must be a weighing of the adverse impact against the defendant's justification"),
ajJ'd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam); see Resident Advisory Bd., v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir.
1977) (holding that a legitimate bona fide governmental interest that cannot be accomplished in a
less discriminatory way might be justified in light of the purposes of the FHA); see also Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. ViiI. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977) (declining to take a
narrow view of the FHA in light of the declared congressional goals behind the Act's section 3601
and the need to construe the FHA broadly in order to implement those goals).
189 See Huntington, 844 F.2d at 936 ("Congress intended that broad application of the anti·
discrimination provisions would ultimately result in residential integration"); see also Trafficante v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (stating that the courts give "vitality" to the Fair
Housing Act only by a "generous construction").
184
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and in practice, a legitimate, bona fide governmental interest," that
justification should weigh heavily in the defendant's favor. 190 Moreover,
two courts have held that a case-by-case inquiry into each facially
discriminatory FHA case will over time create a set of criteria to be used
in determining the validity of a defendant's justification,191 a very useful
tool for the courts in adhering to the purposes of the FHA.
In the case of BRMM, its desire to build a new facility and the need
to segregate women and families from men in order to do so was a long
term goal similar to those found acceptable by some Courts. In SouthSuburban Housing Center v. Greater Southern Suburban Board of
Realtors, the Seventh Circuit permitted a race-based policy set in place to
further an FHA goal of integrating public housing. 192 The Second Circuit
stated in Huntington that the use of a balancing test, weighing short-term
inconvenience against long-term benefit, was necessary to properly
determine whether a defendant can avoid liability for a discriminatory
policy. 193 Furthermore, the Second Circuit has recognized that in FHA
cases, some discriminatory policies can be justified in certain instances
even if that means that members of a protected class will be prevented
from receiving public housing, in order to benefit the community as a
whole rather than only a few of its members. 194 Based on the trend in
which courts accept long-term justifications for discriminatory policies,
the Ninth Circuit had the ability to take the defendants' long term goals
into account. However, it did not do SO.195 The Ninth Circuit foreclosed
an approach that would allow for the expansion of housing opportunities
for protected persons and did not uphold the FHA's goal to do SO.196

Huntington, 844 F.2d at 936.
See Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148 (stating that some Title VIII cases are distinct from Title VII
cases and deserving of specialized review because justifications accepted in a Title VIII context,
such as the business necessity exception, are simply not applicable to Fair Housing Act claims); see
also, Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1283 (outlining four individual factors to be considered and in
turn weighing all party's interests under the headings of each of those the four factors).
192
S.-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 882 (7th
Cir. 1991). In an attempt to integrate the historically Black neighborhood, the policy at issue
reached out to white home buyers, encouraging them to purchase homes in the Black neighborhood.
190

191

Id.
. 193

Huntington, 844 F.2d at 936.

Otero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973).
Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041 (9thCir. 2007).
196 See United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 1988); see also
United States v. Charlottesville Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 718 F. Supp. 461 (W.D.Va. 1989).
194

195
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CONCLUSION

This decision failed to comport with the goals of the Fair Housing
Act as outlined by Congress. 197 The FHA is intended to promote
nondiscriminatory housing for protected classes of persons. 198 By
employing a more flexible approach, balancing a defendant's
justifications against the potential harm to the community and the
plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit could have adhered to the FHA's goals and
created a more permissive precedent, allowing for more housing to be
built for the homeless population of the Boise community in the future.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise,
avoided the legal trend that called for the application of an
individualized, flexible assessment of each FHA claim, in the hopes that
a more thorough decision can be made for each individual community.
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